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We identify and study a new security loophole in continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD)
implementations, related to the imperfect linearity of the homodyne detector. By exploiting this loophole, we
propose an active side-channel attack on the Gaussian-modulated coherent state CV-QKD protocol combining
an intercept-resend attack with an induced saturation of the homodyne detection on the receiver side (Bob). We
show that an attacker can bias the excess noise estimation by displacing the quadratures of the coherent states
received by Bob. We propose a saturation model that matches experimental measurements on the homodyne
detection and use this model to study the impact of the saturation attack on parameter estimation in CV-QKD.We
demonstrate that this attack can bias the excess noise estimation beyond the null key threshold for any system
parameter, thus leading to a full security break. If we consider an additional criteria imposing that the channel
transmission estimation should not be affected by the attack, then the saturation attack can only be launched if
the attenuation on the quantum channel is sufficient, corresponding to attenuations larger than approximately 6
dB. We moreover discuss the possible counter-measures against the saturation attack and propose a new counter-
measure based on Gaussian post-selection that can be implemented by classical post-processing and may allow
to distill secret key when the raw measurement data is partly saturated.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] enables two remote
parties Alice and Bob to share common secure keys which
are unknown to a potential eavesdropper. Unconditional se-
curity of QKD is based on the fundamental laws of quan-
tum mechanics. Side-channels attacks nevertheless remain a
crucial problem to guarantee the security of practical imple-
mentations. As a matter of fact, the models used in security
proofs to describe QKD implementations may not capture all
the possible deviations associated with device imperfections.
This opens the possibility of attacks against QKD implemen-
tations, exploiting either passive (information leakage) or ac-
tive (induced by the attacker) side-channels.
In discrete-variable QKD (DV-QKD), various quantum
hacking strategies exploiting some implementation imperfec-
tions have been proposed, and some of them demonstrated in
experiments [4, 10, 11]. Most of the practical attacks that have
been demonstrated up to now in DV-QKD consist in attacks
targeting the detection part of QKD systems [2–5, 9, 11, 12]
and exploit imperfection of single-photon detectors.
Continuous-variable QKD (CV-QKD), is another promis-
ing approach to perform quantum key distribution. It relies on
continuous modulation of the light field quadratures, which
can be measured with coherent detectors such as homodyne or
heterodyne detections. CV-QKD inherits several interesting
features associated to the use of coherent detection instead of
single-photon detectors: at the system level, CV-QKD can be
implemented with off-the-shelf components that are also used
and optimized in modern optical communications, allowing
for a convergence between quantum and classical communica-
tions [6] and also simplifying the path and the undertaking as-
sociated to photonic integration. Coherent detectors moreover
act as efficient and almost single-mode filters, leading to a
superior capacity for CV-QKD to be wavelength-multiplexed
with intense classical channels over WDM networks [7].
The Gaussian modulated coherent state protocol (GMCS)
CV-QKD protocol [8] is proven secure against collective at-
tacks and recent works have shown progress in proving its
security against arbitrary attacks [14]. However, similarly
to DV-QKD, practical CV-QKD systems can face security
threats linked to imperfect implementations. The validity of
security proofs indeed relies on assumptions that may be vi-
olated in practical setup, opening loopholes that may be ex-
ploited by Eve to mount attacks. For example direct [18] or
indirect [19, 20, 23] manipulation of local oscillator (LO) in-
tensity can fully compromise the security. This imposes to
monitor LO intensity and to use filters to forbid wavelength-
dependent LO intensity manipulations. Moreover, LO inten-
sity fluctuations also can possibly compromise the security of
practical system [21, 22] and a stabilization of LO intensity is
proposed to defend against such attacks [22].
In this work, we have identified a new loophole associated
to the finite range over which coherent detectors respond non-
linearly. We have shown that it can be used to attack practical
implementations of the GMCS CV-QKD protocol. Instead of
targeting the shot noise calibration by manipulating the local
oscillator, we propose an attack that aims at the homodyne
detection located on Bob side, and more specifically at the
electronics of the homodyne detection. We name our attack
”saturation attack”: it combines the induced saturation of the
homodyne detection response with a full intercept-resend at-
tack [32]. Based on a realistic model of the homodyne de-
tection response and saturation behavior, we can show that
the saturation attack can be used get information about Alice
modulated input (via intercept-resend attack, which should in
theory bring the key rate to zero) while jointly manipulating
the measurement results on Bob’s side (taking advantage of
the induced, non-linear response of the homodyne detector).
For some channel and protocol parameters, the saturation at-
tack can lead Alice and Bob to generate, at a positive rate, a
key that they consider as secure, although such key will be
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2totally insecure due to the intercept-resend attack. Hence the
attack can lead to a full security break. Importantly, the at-
tack is also practical and can be realistically launched against
existing implementations, since all practical coherent detec-
tors have a finite linearity domain and could be driven (if not
monitored) outside of this domain of linearity by displacing
the mean value of the received quadratures. We however pro-
pose a counter-measure that can be implemented simply, by
performing on a numerical test on the measurement data. The
counter-measure consists in a pre-calibration of the linearity
domain of the homodyne detector and then to apply a Gaus-
sian post-selection filter to the quadrature measurements re-
sults of Bob, so that the post-selected measurements results
fall within the linearity domain while the post-selected input
data is guaranteed to be Gaussian.
This article is organized as follows. In section II we first
present the GMCS protocol and explain how parameter esti-
mation is performed in this protocol. In section III, we shortly
review existing work on the practical security of CV-QKD and
propose the idea of the saturation attack in section IV. Then
in section V, we study experimentally the influence of satura-
tion on a practical homodyne detector and propose a simple
saturation model to account for it. In section VI, we pro-
pose a strategy to mount an active attack against the GMCS
CV-QKD protocol, taking advantage of induced saturation. In
section VII, we perform numerical simulations to analyze the
influence of the saturation attack on parameter estimation, in
particular on channel transmission and excess noise and then
discuss the impact on secret key rate, under two different se-
curity criteria. In section VIII we discuss possible counter-
measure and present and analyze a counter-measure based on
Gaussian post-selection. Finally, in section IX we summarize
the main results of our work and discuss some perspectives.
II. GAUSSIAN MODULATED COHERENT STATE
CONTINUOUS-VARIABLE QUANTUM KEY
DISTRIBUTION
A. Protocol
In the GMCS CV-QKD protocol [8], Alice encodes infor-
mation on coherent states of light, that can be easily produced
by a laser. The information is encoded on the quadratures XA
and PA of coherent states; with a centered bivariate Gaussian
modulation of variance VAN0. N0 is the shot noise variance
that appears in the Heisenberg uncertainty relation for the non-
commuting quadratures, it corresponds to the variance of the
homodyne detection output when the input signal is the vac-
uum field. Alice sends these Gaussian modulated coherent
states, which constitute the quantum signal, to Bob through
the quantum channel. On the reception side, Bob randomly
chooses to measure either quadrature X or P by performing
a balanced homodyne detection on the signal, using for that a
strong phase reference, called local oscillator, and switching
the quadrature measurement by varying the relative phase of
LO with respect the quantum signal to be either 0 or pi/2.
Keeping track of modulated quadrature data XA (or PA)
and quadrature measurement results XB or (PB), Alice and
Bob obtain strings of correlated classical data by repeating
many times this process over time over successive pulses.
They can then use error correction to obtain identical strings
from their correlated data through reverse reconciliation [8,
27] and further perform privacy amplification to obtain a se-
cret key.
In the analysis carried out in this article, that focuses on the
impact of a new side-channel on CV-QKD, we don’t consider
finite size effects [13], and assume that all the estimations are
performed in the asymptotic limit. We moreover consider the
security against collective attacks to compute secret key rate.
One can moreover show that Gaussian attacks are the optimal
collective attacks against the GMCS protocol in the asymp-
totic limit of infinite number of signals [25, 26]. Hence we
can analyze the security of the protocol by considering a lin-
ear channel model with additive Gaussian noise. In this Gaus-
sian linear model, the Alice-Bob channel is fully characterized
by two parameters: the channel transmission and the excess
noise. The channel transmission is related to the channel loss
and can be derived from the correlation between Alice and
Bob’s data. The excess noise is the variance of Bob quadra-
ture measurements in excess of the shot noise, it can be due to
device imperfections (in particular imperfect modulation and
noisy detections) or eavesdropper’s actions on the channel.
B. Parameter estimation
In order to estimate parameters from Alice and Bob’s cor-
related variables, the Gaussian linear model (Eq.(1)) with ad-
ditive Gaussian noise is considered.
XB = tXA +XN (1)
In Eq.(1), t =
√
ηT , T is the channel transmission and η is the
optical transmission through Bob set-up (including homodyne
detection’s finite efficiency). On Alice side, XA is a Gaussian
random variable centered on zero with variance VA. XN is the
total noise which follows a centered normal distribution with
variance σ2N = N0 + ηTξ + vele. This variance includes shot
noise N0, excess noise ξ and electronic noise of Bob vele.
In this article, we follow the parameter estimation proce-
dure of Ref [28]. We can obtain three equations (Eq. (2)-(4))
relating modulated data XA and measured data XB to param-
eter estimation :
VA = V ar(XA) = 〈(XA − 〈XA〉)2〉 (2)
VB = V ar(XB) = 〈(XB − 〈XB〉)2〉 (3)
= ηTVA +N0 + ηTξ + vele
Cov(XA, XB) = 〈XAXB〉 − 〈XA〉〈XB〉 (4)
=
√
ηTVA
Additionally, in order to measure the shot noise N0, Bob
needs to close the signal port so he can measure the variance
when the input signal is vacuum. When there is no signal
impinging on the homodyne detection, the variance of homo-
dyne detection is used to calibrate the value of shot noise. In
3this case Eq. (3) reduces to an additional equation, obtained
by performing a shot noise calibration:
VB0 = N0 + vele. (5)
Note that η and vele are also calibrated values, measured
before launching the protocol.
The parameter characterizing the quantum channel in the
Gaussian linear model, i.e. T and ξ can then be estimated
from Eq. (2)-(4):
T =
Cov(XA, XB)
2
ηV ar(XA)2
(6)
ξ =
V ar(XB)
ηT
− V ar(XA)− N0
ηT
− vele
ηT
(7)
Additionally, by calibrating the shot noise variance N0 from
Eq.(5), all variances and correlations can be normalized in
shot noise units and can then be used to estimate the secret
key rate.
C. Security model and achievable secret key rate
In order to estimate the secret key rate, Alice and Bob need
to compute the mutual information between their data and es-
timate an upper bound of Eve’s information. In this article, pa-
rameter estimation and secret key rates will be analyzed in the
context of collective attacks, in the asymptotic regime [25].
Although the security of CV-QKD can be analyzed in a more
general setting, we want to stress that extending our analy-
sis to more general (and complex) security models would not
qualitatively change the main finding of our article. As a mat-
ter of fact we exhibit an explicit attack strategy, exploiting the
saturation of the homodyne. As we shall demonstrate, this at-
tack leads to a complete security break against a an attacker
limited to collective attacks, assuming parameter estimation is
performed in the asymptotic regime. By extension, our pro-
posed attack would also lead to a complete security break un-
der more general security models, that consist in “increasing”
the power of the eavesdropper.
A lower bound on the secret key rate achievable against col-
lective attack (in the asymptotic limit) for the CV-QKD pro-
tocol can be expressed as R = βIAB − χBE [31]. It is com-
posed of two terms: IAB is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob and χBE the Holevo bound of Eve’s knowl-
edge, β ∈ [0, 1] is the reconciliation efficiency, related to the
fact that practical error correction usually does not reach the
Shannon limit (which would correspond to the case β = 1).
IAB is a decreasing function of the excess noise, while χBE
is an increasing function of excess noise, hence any rise of the
excess noise will lead to a decrease of the secret key rate R.
III. PRACTICAL SECURITY ISSUES: LOOPHOLES AND
ATTACKS IN CV-QKD
In practical CV-QKD implementations [29, 31], the lo-
cal oscillator is transmitted publicly on the optical line be-
tween Alice and Bob, multiplexed with the quantum chan-
nel. Hence the LO can be accessed, and thus manipulated by
an attacker in practical implementations. It is important to
note that the LO can in principle be generated locally at Bob
side, as demonstrated in recent proof-of-principle experiments
[15, 16], where the LO is phase-locked with the quantum sig-
nals emitted by Alice. However, phase-locking two distant
lasers brings more complexity and noise and all practical CV-
QKD full demonstrations have so far been performed with a
”public” LO. This opens the door to different attack strategies
based on LO manipulation. An eavesdropper can for exam-
ple modify several properties of the LO pulse, such as the in-
tensity, the wavelength, or the pulse shape [18–23, 30]. The
eavesdropper can in particular bias the shot noise calibration
(Eq. (5)) by manipulating the LO intensity or its overlap with
the quantum signal. We have indeed seen that the excess noise
is expressed in shot noise units. If the shot noise is overesti-
mated while all the other measurements remain unchanged,
the excess noise in shot noise unit (SNU) will then be under-
estimated. As a consequence Alice and Bob will then overes-
timate their secret key rate, leading to a security problem.
Most existing attacks rely on shot noise estimation induced
by different LO manipulations combined with specific strate-
gies. In Ref [18], equal-amplitude attack is described. By re-
placing the quantum signal and the LO pulse by two squeezed
states of equal amplitude, Eve can make Alice and Bob mea-
sure an excess noise estimate that is much lower than the ac-
tual shot noise. This attack may allow Eve to break the se-
curity without being detected if Bob doesn’t monitor the LO
intensity, that is strongly modified in this attack. In Ref [30],
the authors propose a strategy where Eve changes the shape
of the LO pulse to introduce a delay on the clock trigger. As
a consequence, the variance of the shot noise measurement
can be lowered without changing the LO power. Such cal-
ibration attack biases the estimation of shot noise and thus
the excess noise in shot noise units. The authors propose a
counter-measure based on real time monitoring of the shot
noise method to prevent this LO manipulation loophole. In
Ref [19] and Ref [20], as an extension of the equal-amplitude
attack [18], a wavelength attack on a CV-QKD system using
heterodyne detection has been proposed. In this attack, by ex-
ploiting the wavelength dependent property of the homodyne
detection’s beam splitter, Eve can bias the intensity transmis-
sions of LO and signal. By inserting light pulses at different
wavelengths, this attack allows Eve to bias the shot noise es-
timation even if it is performed in real time. This attack can
be prevented by adding a wavelength filter before the beam
splitter. Recently in [23], similar wavelength attack has been
proposed to compromise the practical security of CV-QKD
system using an homodyne detection. An improved real-time
shot noise measurement technique is also proposed to detect
this attack, closing all known wavelength attack loopholes.
To summarize, the main idea of existing attacks on CV-
4QKD consist in manipulating the local oscillator in different
ways so that the eavesdropper can bias the shot noise esti-
mation and thus the excess noise. The threat of such attacks
can be removed if Alice and Bob ”locally” generate LO pulse
[15, 16] or measure the shot noise in real time instead of re-
lying on an off-line calibration [30]. LO is an important issue
for the practical security in CV-QKD, but as we will demon-
strate with the introduction of the saturation, it is not the only
implementation loophole that should be considered in practi-
cal CV-QKD.
IV. PRINCIPLE OF THE SATURATION ATTACK
Unlike the attacks aiming at the local oscillator, we intro-
duce a new attack on CV-QKD which exploits the finite lin-
earity domain of the homodyne detection response. Indeed, an
implicit but nevertheless fundamental assumption in the secu-
rity proofs of CV-QKD is that the response of the homodyne
detection is linear with respect to the input quadrature. This
assumption is necessary because parameter estimation (Eq.
2-4) assumes that the quadrature measurement performed by
Bob are linearly related to the optical field quadratures, in or-
der to relate them to the parameters (T and ξ) of the quantum
channel. However, for a practical coherent detector, such as
the homodyne detection used in to implement the GMCS CV-
QKD protocol, the linearity domain is limited. If the value
of input quadrature is too large, linearity may not be verified,
leading to a saturated behavior.
From section II.B, we can observe that, based on the Gaus-
sian linear model (Eq.1), the parameter estimation consists in
the evaluation of the covariance matrix. It is interesting to no-
tice that the different coefficient of the covariance matrix are
invariant under any linear shifts of the quadratures. Indeed the
security evaluation in CV-QKD relies solely on the evaluation
of second order moments of the quadrature, while the first or-
der moments (mean value) are not monitored. This leaves Eve
the freedom to manipulate quadratures mean value. Combin-
ing this observation with the existence of a finite domain of
linearity for the detection, a natural attack strategy for Eve is
to actively introduce a large displacement on the quadrature
received by Bob in order to force the homodyne detection to
operate in its saturated region. This strategy, that is the core
idea of the saturation attack, enables Eve to influence Bob’s
measurement results and to bias parameter estimation. Im-
portantly, unlike the attacks targeting the local oscillator, in
which the shot noise measurement is influenced, saturation
attacks do not bias the shot noise calibration but still influence
the excess noise estimation.
V. SATURATION OF A HOMODYNE DETECTOR
Saturation of the homodyne detection typically occurs
when the input field quadrature overpasses a threshold. This
threshold depends on characteristics of the homodyne detec-
tor’s electronics, such as the amplifiers linearity domain or the
data acquisition card (DAQ) range (Fig.1). If Bob performs
FIG. 1: Model for a practical homodyne detection: its output XBsat
can be seen as the ideal output XBlin on which a saturation function
is applied (Eq. 8)
quadrature measurements on input signals falling outside of
the detector’s linearity range, the measurement statistics will
be influenced by the saturation. Saturation will in particular
lead to decrease in the variance of the measurement results.
A. Saturation model
The quadrature measurement performed with an homodyne
detection consists in the subtraction in the electronic domain
of the photo-currents produced by the two photodiodes fol-
lowed by an electronic front-end and acquisition. The stan-
dard analysis considers that the homodyne response is linear
with respect to the input quadratures. We then denote the mea-
sured quadrature as XBlin (XB in section.II). However, the
linear detection range of a practical homodyne detector can-
not be infinite. We propose a saturation model (Eq.(8)) with
predefined upper and lower bounds for the homodyne detec-
tion response: for quadrature input values between these two
bounds, the response of homodyne detection is unaffected,
otherwise it saturates to a constant value. To simplify the anal-
ysis, we have assumed in this model that the linear detection
range can be described by one single parameter, α, intrinsic
to the detector. Under this saturation model, the linear range
is [−α, α] and the measured quadrature is called XBsat . The
relation between XBsatand XBlin is the following:
XBlin > α, XBsat = α
if | XBlin |< α, then XBsat = XBlin
XBlin 6 −α, XBsat = −α
(8)
As expected, if α → ∞, the saturation model is equivalent
to the standard linear model. In a typical (non saturated)
CV-QKD implementation, the value of α is large enough to
ensure that field quadratures almost never overpass the satu-
ration threshold limit. Alice and Bob can in practice guar-
antee the linearity by limiting number of photons imping-
ing on the homodyne detector to be much smaller than α2.
Since the limit α is intrinsic to the electronics of the detec-
tor, a practical way to guarantee with high probability that
α XBlin is to lower the LO intensity so that the shot noise
valueN0  α2. In general, input quadrature modulation vari-
ance are calibrated in shot noise units which depends on LO
5intensity and Alice can choose a Gaussian modulation with
〈XBlin〉 = 0 and V ar(XBlin)  α2 so that the detector
does not saturate. However, as mentioned earlier this proce-
dure cannot cope with situations where XBlin mean value is
strongly displaced, as it will be the case in saturation attack.
B. Experimental observation of saturation
In a practical balanced homodyne detector, the common
mode rejection ration (CMRR) is not infinite and the mean
value of the homodyne detection in absence of input signal
is affected by the imbalance, leading to: 〈XB0,lin〉 = ILO,
where ILO is the LO intensity, and  is the imbalance fac-
tor which is dependent on experimental imperfections such as
photodiode quantum efficiency mismatch or beam-splitter im-
balance.
Because of this imperfection (but in absence of satu-
ration), the relation between measured noise variance (in
V olt2) and LO intensity (in µW ) usually can be written as:
V ar(XB0,lin) = AILO + B [17] (We neglect the quadratic
part since in our case the LO power is relatively low). ILO is
the LO intensity, A is linear with ILO and is related to shot
noise while B is independent of ILO and is related to elec-
tronic noise. The value of A and B can be determined experi-
mentally.
We have performed experimental shot noise measurement,
measuring the variance of the homodyne detection output, as
a function of ILO. This has revealed that the measured shot
noise variance is linear with ILO on a given range, and then
drops when the LO intensity is above a certain value. We have
analyzed this behavior with the saturation model presented in
section V.A and compared its prediction to experimental mea-
surements of Fig.2. We display the measured homodyne de-
tection output and its variance, for vacuum input signal as a
function of ILO. The experimental results are displayed on
Fig.2. The linear behavior can be observed when LO intensity
is below 35 µW . Due to the imbalance of homodyne detec-
tion (), the mean value of the homodyne output can become
large as the LO intensity increases. If these values overpass
the linearity threshold (in the present case 0.5 V, due to the
DAQ card) the homodyne detection response saturates to a
constant value (Fig.2 (a)). As a consequence, measured shot
noise variance strongly decreases (Fig.2 (b)) when such satu-
ration happens.
In order to check the validity of the saturation model in-
troduced in Eq.(8), we have simulated the expected homo-
dyne detection response with our saturation model and com-
pared it with experimental measurements. We first deter-
mine the parameters A and B from linear fit on 〈XB0,lin〉 and
V ar(XB0,lin) versus LO intensity over the domain of linear-
ity (ILO < 35µW ). The saturation parameter α is here fixed
by our DAQ range: α = 0.5V . We then apply the saturation
model Eq.(8) to the variable XB0,lin to obtain XB0,sat . We
compute the mean 〈XB0,sat〉 and the variance V ar(X2B0,sat),
which result in the behavior shown in Fig.2. For the measured
shot noise under saturation, the simulation results match very
well with our experimental data. It indicates that our proposed
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
LO Intensity uw
M
ea
n 
V
 
 
Simulation results
Experimental data
(a)Mean of the homodyne output 〈XB0,sat 〉vs LO Intensity.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
x 10−3
LO Intensity uw
Va
ria
nc
e 
V2
 
 
Simulation results
Experimental data
(b)Variance of the homodyne output V ar(XB0,sat ) vs LO Intensity.
FIG. 2: Experimental characterization of the saturation behavior of
a practical homodyne detection.
saturation model is realistic and can be further used to inter-
pret our saturation attack.
VI. ATTACK STRATEGY
A. Intercept-resend attack
The intercept-resend attack play an important role as being
one part of our saturation attack. Intercept-resend attack [32]
in CV-QKD is achievable with today’s technologies and its
security analysis has been studied in previous work [32]. In
such attack, Eve intercepts all the pulses sent by Alice on the
quantum channel and measures simultaneously the X and P
quadratures with the help of a heterodyne detection. Eve then
prepares a coherent state according to her measurement results
and sends it to Bob. Under such attack the correlation between
Eve and Bob data will be stronger than the one between Al-
ice and Bob so that Eve always has an information advan-
tage. Due to measurement disturbance and coherent state
shot noise, the intercept-resend attack, that is entanglement-
6breaking, introduces two shot noise units of excess noise. In
practice, Eve’s device and her action can introduce additional
excess noise. A full intercept-resend attack will therefore in-
troduce at least two shot noise units of excess noise, which
should forbid the generation of secret key under collective at-
tacks. This however assumes that the estimation procedure
is not biased. We will see on the contrary that a saturation at-
tack can bias the excess noise estimation and lead to a security
break.
B. Saturation attack
The saturation attack on the GMCS CV-QKD protocol is an
active attack, where Eve combines a full intercept-resend at-
tack with an induced saturation of Bob detector. Saturation of
Bob homodyne detection is obtained by displacing the quadra-
ture of the resent coherent state. The displacement value ∆ is
chosen by Eve but is constant for each resent coherent state
pulse. When performing the intercept-resend attack, Eve can
also choose to rescale the resent quadratures by a gain g.
Eve chooses the attack parameter bias the estimated excess
noise below the null key threshold (calculated under collec-
tive attack [31]), so that according to their estimation, Alice
and Bob will assume they can obtain a positive key rate, and
will accept to distill such a key based on parameter estimation,
while no secure key can be obtained from the actual correla-
tions since a full intercept-resend attack has been performed.
We propose a visual description of our saturation attack in
Fig.3 in which we distinguish mainly two functional blocks:
quadrature measurement and quadrature re-preparation. By
using a heterodyne detection, Eve measures Alice’s quadra-
ture XA and PA simultaneously. In order to simplify our
analysis, we assume that Eve’s station is located at Alice’s
output and that the channel transmission between Alice-Bob
and Eve-Bob are equal. Moreover, we assume that Alice and
Bob measure their shot noise and monitor the LO intensity
in real time [30], with two transmission coefficients randomly
decided at Bob side (η1 = 1, η2 = 0).
Eve’s measurement results (XM , PM ) after the heterodyne
measurement are expressed as:
XM =
1√
2
(XA +X0 +X
′
0 +XNA,E ) (9)
PM =
1√
2
(PA + P0 + P
′
0 + PNA,E ) (10)
Where X0 is a noise term due to the coherent state encod-
ing of Alice while X ′0 is a noise term due to 3 dB loss in the
heterodyne detection. XNA,E is a random noise that accounts
for the technical noise of Alice’s preparation and Eve’s mea-
surement process with its variance ξA,E .
In the re-preparation stage, Eve prepares a coherent state
with quadratures (XE , PE) according to her measurement
(XM , PM ). Eve can also induce a displacement (∆X ,∆P )
and an amplification (g) on the dataXM before optical encod-
ing. In our further analysis, we only look at the X quadrature
but the treatment for the quadrature P is totally symmetric.
The resend quadrature of Eve can be written as:
XE = gXM + ∆X +X
′′
0 (11)
=
g√
2
(XA +X0 +X
′
0 +XNA,E ) + ∆X +X
′′
0 (12)
Where,X ′′0 is a noise term due to coherent state encoding of
Eve. X0, X ′0 and X
′′
0 all follow N (0, N0) with their variance
equal to one unit of shot noise (N0).
Introducing displacement on coherent states is experi-
mentally achievable [34] and since Eve prepares the new
states, the displacement parameter (∆X ,∆P ) can be freely
chosen by her. We will first consider that Eve chooses an
amplification coefficient g =
√
2, in order to compensate the
loss from the heterodyne detection.
a. Linear detection On Bob side, Bob measures the
quadrature sent by Eve by performing a homodyne detection.
We first consider Bob uses a homodyne detection whose linear
detection range is infinite (Fig.1). The measured quadrature
(XBlin ) can be written as
XBlin = t(XE +XNE,B ) +
√
1− t2X ′′′0 +Xele (13)
After the propagation through the lossy channel, technical
noise of Eve and Bob XNE,B (V ar(XNE,B ) = ξE,B), vac-
uum noise
√
1− t2X ′′′0 (V ar(X ′′′0 ) = N0) and electronic
noise of Bob Xele (V ar(Xele) = vele) are added to the
quadrature prepared by Eve (XE). Here t =
√
ηT , where
T is the channel transmission between Eve and Bob, and η is
the Bob’s efficiency. The correlation between Alice and Bob
and the variance of Bob can be written as:
Cov(XA, XBlin) = 〈XAXBlin〉
=
tg√
2
〈XAXA〉+ t∆X〈XA〉
=
tg√
2
V ar(XA)
(14)
V ar(XBlin) =〈X2Blin〉 − 〈XBlin〉2
=
t2g2
2
[V ar(XA) + 2N0 + ξsys] + (1− t2)N0
+ t2N0 + vele + t
2∆2X − t2∆2X
=ηT
G
2
V ar(XA) + ηT
G
2
(2N0 + ξsys)
+N0 + vele
(15)
In Eq. (14),(15), we can see that with an ideal linear detec-
tion range, the induced displacement ∆x has no influence on
the measurement results, since the terms of ∆x has no impact
on both correlation and variance measurements.
Under linear detection and intercept-resend attack with
the gain G = g2 = 2, the correlation (Eq.(14)) is not
modified by Eve’s action, so that the estimated channel
7FIG. 3: General description of GMCS CV-QKD under the saturation attack. Alice: prepare the coherent state with quadratures X and P; Eve:
measurement and re-preparation stage, G:gain, D:displacement; Bob: perform the homodyne detection, AM:amplitude modulator, η1, η2:
signal transmission coefficients, PM:phase modulator, −α, α: linear working range.
transmission is not biased (Tlin = T ). Based on Eq.(7), the
excess noise estimation on Alice side is ξlin = 2N0 + ξsys,
where ξsys = ξA,E + 2GξB,E . Similarly to section.II, we
introduce the noise variable XN which contains all the
noise added to Bob’s measurement, the variance of XN is
σ2N = ηT
G
2 (2N0 + ξsys) +N0 + vele.
b. Saturated detection As we have seen the linearity of
the homodyne detection cannot be guaranteed over an arbi-
trary large detection range. A more realistic model consists
in taking saturation into account, according to the saturation
model described in Eq.(8): we denote XBsat the quadrature
measured by Bob in a model taking saturation into account.
Under this modified model, the quadrature measured by Bob.
XBsat = XBlin only if |XBlin | < α. Otherwise the quadra-
ture measurement results saturate to a constant value, equal to
the detection limit α or −α.
Eve can freely set the displacement value (∆X ,∆P ) so
that XBlin can partially overpass the linear range [−α, α].
In further analysis, we consider ∆ = t∆X as the displace-
ment value. In order to induce a given value of ∆ on the
quadrature of the coherent state impinging on Bob, Eve can
choose a proper ∆X once she knows t, that typically depends
on the distance. As we shall see, parameter estimation af-
fected by saturation can lead to excess noise below the null
key threshold. In the next section, we will show that under
certain conditions of our attack strategy, Eve can manipulate
the channel transmission and the excess noise estimated by
Alice and Bob, so that her intercept resend action can remain
under cover while fully compromising the practical security
of the CV-QKD protocol.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Parameter estimation under the saturation attack
The channel transmission and excess noise estimation fully
characterize the quantum channel of CV-QKD, we thus only
need to analyze the impact of saturation on these two es-
timated parameters. It is in particular critical to evaluate
whether an induced saturation can reduce the excess noise es-
timation as thus opens the door to severe attacks.
1. Channel transmission estimation
Under the saturation attack, Alice encodes XA and Bob
measures XBsat (Eq.(8) and Eq.(13)) and they evaluate the
correlation coefficient: Cov(XA, XBsat) (calculation details
can be found in Appendix A). From this correlation coeffi-
cient(A.3), the estimation of the channel transmission under
saturation attack Tˆsat can be expressed as:
Tˆsat = T
G
8
[1 + erf(
α−∆√
2V ar(XBlin)
)]2(∆ > 0) (16)
In which, erf is the error function defined in Eq.(A4) and
V ar(XBlin) is the variance of Bob’s measurement under lin-
ear detection. As we have discussed in section III, a rea-
sonable assumption for the detector linearity limit α is that
α2 >> V ar(XBlin) and α
2 >> N0, so that the measure-
ment results of Bob would not affected by saturation in ab-
sence of displacement. This agrees with Eq.(16): if α − ∆
is much larger than
√
2V ar(XBlin), then Tˆsat ' T
G
2
which
is the estimated value under the linear model (G = 2 being
the natural rescaling choice to compensate the loss introduced
by the heterodyne detection). However when ∆ is close to
α, the impact of saturation becomes important, and Tˆsat be-
comes smaller than T . An extreme case is when ∆ is much
larger than α, the error function becomes −1 and Tˆsat = 0.
2. Excess noise estimation
From Eq.(7), the estimated excess noise depends on the
variance of Bob’s measurement and on the channel transmis-
sion between Alice and Bob. Under the saturation attack,
these two values will both decrease. We need to evaluate these
two values to see whether the induced saturation will result in
reducing the estimated excess noise. We have already ana-
lyzed Tˆsat in the previous subsection (Eq.(16)). With Eq.(8),
8we can calculate V ar(XBsat) under saturation attack (calcu-
lation details can be found in Appendix.B.). Based on Tˆsat
and V ar(XBsat), we are able to express the estimated excess
noise in shot noise units under the saturation attack :
ξˆsat
N0
=
1
ηT G2 (1 +A)
2N0
[V ar(XBlin)(1 +A−
B2
pi
)
− 2
√
2V ar(XBlin)
pi
(α−∆)A ∗B
+ (α−∆)2(1−A2)− 4N0 − 4vele]− VA
N0
(17)
In which A and B are given by:
A =erf(
α−∆√
2V ar(XBlin)
), B = e
− (α−∆)2
2V ar(XBlin
) . (18)
From Eq.(17), we can verify that when the value of α−∆ is
much larger than
√
2V ar(XBlin), thenA→ 1 andB → 0, so
that ξˆsat =
V ar(XB)
ηT −V ar(XA)−N0ηT − veleηT = ξlin(Eq.(7)). It
can be considered that no saturation is induced and the excess
noise estimation is not affected.
3. Estimated excess noise can be made arbitrary small
We can prove, by the use of the intermediate value theorem,
that ξˆsat can be manipulated to be any value below ξ and in
particular any value below ξ an arbitrarily small.
Proposition Under saturation attack, for any 0 < ξT < ξ,
there always exist a particular value of the displacement ∆T
for which ξˆsat = ξT
Proof ξˆsat is a function of ∆. When ∆ = 0, ξˆsat(0) =
ξ > 0, where ξ = 2N0 + ξsys under intercept-resend at-
tack. When ∆ = 2α, since we can assume that α2 >>
V ar(XBlin), we then have A = −erf( α√2V ar(XBlin ) ) = −1,
and ξˆsat(2α) → −∞. Since ξˆsat is a continuous function of
∆ over the interval [0, 2α), then for any ξT in (−∞,ξ] there
always exists a ∆ ∈ [0, 2α) so that ξˆsat = ξT .
B. Defining criteria of success for the saturation attack
Alice and Bob estimate the key rate based on their estima-
tion of excess noise and channel transmission. If the excess
noise is too large, it won’t allow Alice and Bob to distill any
secret key. A full security break consists in an attack where
Eve has full knowledge on the generated key while Alice and
Bob still accept this compromised key material. An intercept-
resend attack is an attack strategy that leads in general to a
denial of service but not to a full security break on CV-QKD.
On the other hand, we want to claim that the saturation attack
can be used to obtain a full security break.
To clarify what we mean, we define a first criteria (level
I) for a successful saturate attack, corresponding to a set of
conditions to meet:
Level I criteria for a successful saturation attack:
• The attacker Eve performs the saturation attack:
Intercept-resend attack combined with displace-
ment.
• Alice and Bob obtain a positive key rate from their
estimated parameters Tˆsat, ξˆsat.
This set of condition corresponds to a full security break
because Alice and Bob will obtain a positive key rate under
the attack and thus accept key material, while this key is in-
secure as it can be fully obtained by Eve. Because the propo-
sition enounced in VII A 3, we can prove the saturation attack
can always meet Level I criteria: for any quantum channel,
characterized by T and ξ, the saturation attack can turn the
parameter estimation always turn the estimated parameter to
ξˆsat ' 0 while 0 < Tˆsat < T . In particular, under saturation,
as the estimated excess noise can be made arbitrarily close to
zero, Alice and Bob will always generate some positive key
rate, and level 1 criteria can always be met.
While level I criteria defines conditions for a successful at-
tack, the induced saturation can in practice strongly decrease
the estimated channel transmission Tˆsat (Eq.(16)). This can
be a problem in practice since Alice and Bob usually have a
good a-priori estimate of the channel transmission based on
their knowledge of the channel length and of the fiber atten-
uation coefficient. In addition, channel loss are usually cali-
brated before any new optical device (such as a QKD system)
is installed. If the measured channel transmission is much
lower than the expected value for a given link distance, Alice
and Bob can reasonably be suspicious and they may decide
to reject the key. This motivates us to introduce additional
conditions to the list, and to define an Level II criteria for a
successful saturation attack.
Level II criteria for a successful saturation attack:
• The attacker Eve performs the saturation attack
(Intercept-resend attack on each pulse combined
with displacement of each resent pulse).
• Maintain the channel transmission estimation un-
affected (Tˆsat = T ).
• Alice and Bob obtain a positive key rate from their
estimated parameters Tˆsat, ξˆsat.
The strategy for Eve, in order to meet this level II criteria,
will be to adjust not only the displacement ∆, but also the gain
g, in the saturation attack.
9C. Analysis and simulation results
We will formalize two strategies for Eve and study numeri-
cally whether they can be used to meet the two criteria for the
success of the saturation attack, respectively. We use Eq.(16)
and Eq.(17) to perform numerical evaluation of Tˆsat and ξˆsat,
in order to study the impact of the saturation attack.
1. Assumptions used in the numerical simulations
We have performed numerical simulations of the estimated
excess noise ξˆsat, the estimated channel transmission Tˆsat,
and the secret key rate under collective attack. We have cho-
sen our simulation parameters in order to match typical pa-
rameters that can be achieved and chosen for the operation of
an experimental CV-QKD system:
• Deployment over a dark fiber, with quantum channel
wavelength in the C band and fiber attenuation coeffi-
cient a = 0.2dB/km.
• Total optical transmission (including homodyne detec-
tion finite efficiency) of Bob: η = 0.55.
• Linear detection limit of Bob’s homodyne detection:
α = 20
√
N0.
• Variance of the electronic noise vele = 0.015N0, i.e.
a result that can typically be achieved with a 10 MHz
bandwidth homodyne detection and system clock rate
of 1 MHz [29].
• We have chosen a conservative value ξsys = 0.1 for
the system excess noise (equivalent excess noise at the
input) in our simulations. This value is relatively high
compared to some demonstrated experimental results in
CV-QKD [7, 29] but it has been encountered in [32],
when performing the experimental demonstration of the
intercept-resend attack . Adopting a pessimistic value
for system excess noise has in conservative and will not
weaken our predictions concerning the power of the sat-
uration attack on practical systems.
• In a practical CV-QKD deployment, the value of Al-
ice variance modulation VA depends on the link dis-
tance. This is in particular due to finite reconciliation
efficiency in practice. To achieve a high reconciliation
efficiency in practical CV-QKD (β = 0.95), optimized
error correction codes work at a fixed signal to noise ra-
tio (SNR). Therefore Alice needs to optimize her mod-
ulation variance with respect to the distance in order to
work at a given SNR. We have followed the procedure
described in Ref [27] to choose Alice’s variance with
respect to distance in our numerical simulations.
2. Attack strategy I: Meeting level I criteria by varying ∆
Let us define strategy I more precisely:
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FIG. 4: Simulations of estimated excess noise and channel transmis-
sion under attack strategy I. Simulation parameters: see VII C 1.
• Eve implements the saturation attack as described in
VI B.
• Eve chooses a fixed gain value G = g2 = 2 in order to
compensate the loss due to heterodyne detection.
• By choosing the value of ∆, Eve bias the excess noise
estimation of Alice and Bob below the null key thresh-
old, so that Alice and Bob can obtain a positive key rate.
The key idea of this strategy is that, for a given distance
with the knowledge of V ar(XBlin), Eve can manipulate ξˆsat
by changing ∆. More importantly, Eve needs to manipulate
the excess noise evaluation so that ξˆsat falls below the null
key threshold, but remains positive, to meet the level I suc-
cess criteria. ξˆsat is a function of ∆ (Eq.(16)), the behavior of
ξˆsat versus ∆ is shown in Fig.4 (a). Under the linear model,
the total estimated excess noise under a full intercept-resend
attack is ξˆlin = ξ = 2.1 including 0.1 technical noise (black
curves in Fig.4 (a)). With such an excess noise, no key rate can
be established by Alice and Bob. However, ξˆsat can be ma-
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nipulated by changing the value of ∆. In Fig.4 (a), for long
distance (i.e. above 20 km) ξˆsat always decreases when ∆ in-
creases. Especially when ∆ is close to α, ξˆsat is significantly
reduced, which agrees with the analysis in section VII.A. For
short distance (i.e. below 15 km), when ∆ increases , ξˆsat
first increases then decreases, but ξˆsat can still become arbi-
trary small when ∆ is large enough. Importantly, from Fig.4
(a), we can see that Eve can obtain an arbitrary small value of
ξˆsat by manipulating ∆ at any distance, which agrees with the
analysis in section VII.A.2.
A drawback of this strategy I of saturation attack is that the
estimated channel transmission can be strongly reduced, i.e.
we can have Tˆsat  T (Eq.(16)). In Fig.4 (b) we plot the
estimated channel transmission in log scale versus distance,
in which the black curve is the estimated channel transmission
(T ) versus distance in absence of attack while the other curves
are estimated channel transmission (Tˆsat) under the saturation
attack. We can see that the estimated channel transmission can
be strongly reduced in comparison to the actual transmission
in absence of attack. This is especially if ∆ is large, which will
be the case, as we can see on Fig.4 (a) for short links, where it
is necessary to use large value of ∆ to effectively reduce the
excess noise estimation and meet criteria I. Hence even though
the attack strategy I can always been mounted, it may lead
to use large displacement value ∆ (typically or even beyond
the saturation limit α set to 20 in our simulations). This will
strongly reduce the effective transmission of the channel Tˆsat
and therefore the achievable secret key rate.
3. Attack strategy II : Meeting level II criteria by varying ∆ and g
As we have just discussed, inducing the saturation of the
homodyne detection (through the displacement ∆) can lower
the correlation between Alice and Bob’s data, which will re-
sult in the decrease of the estimated channel transmission Tˆsat
(Fig.4(b)) and thus also of the achievable secret key rate by
performing the GMCS CV-QKD protocol over the the chan-
nel.
However, as already stated in VII B, there are many prac-
tical cases where Alice and Bob may monitor, or at least
perform some kinds of consistency check on the estimated
transmission and could therefore identify a problem if the es-
timated transmission, that becomes Tˆsat under the attack, is
significantly smaller than the value of T they expect.
This motivates to define a second attack strategy, capable of
meeting level II criteria: perform the saturation attack, obtain
a positive key rate while leaving the estimation the channel
transmission unchanged.
Level II criteria can clearly not been achieved with solely
by varying the displacement ∆ applied on the coherent states.
However, the intercept-resend that is part of the saturation at-
tack leaves an additional degree of freedom: Eve can apply
rescale the value of the resent quadratures (classical result ob-
tained after the heterodyne detection) by a gain g that she can
also freely choose.
To meet the success criteria II, we will study a second strat-
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egy is similar to strategy I except for the second step where the
gain g will be set according to Eq.(19), In which V ar(XBlin)
is given by Eq.(15).
As a matter of fact if Eq.(19) is verified, then 〈XAXBsat〉 =
1
2
〈X2A〉t and we will thus have Tˆsat = T , which guarantees
that the channel transmission estimation for Alice and Bob is
not biased.
2
√
2
g
− 1 = erf( α−∆√
V ar(XBlin)
) (19)
g can now been considered as a function of ∆, as displayed
in Fig.5(a). Furthermore, in order to see whether we can meet
criteria II and have a full security break with this new choice
of g we still need to analyze the estimated of excess noise
and secret key rate. By taking the g solutions of Eq.(19) into
account, the behavior of ξˆsat versus ∆ is shown in Fig.5 (b).
We can see that if the distance is longer than 30 km it is
always possible to reduce ξˆsat close to zero by choosing a
11
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value of ∆ close to α, and thus to have an attack meeting
criteria II. On the other hand, if the distance is smaller than
approximately 30 km, it will not be possible to meet the attack
success criteria II and to jointly maintain the estimate of the
channel transmission unchanged and have a positive key rate
while launching the saturation attack. Thus the capacity to
launch a successful saturation attack under success criteria II
is dependent on the distance, as it can be seen to Fig.5 (b).
We also need to study the condition for ξˆsat < ξnull as we
previously did in VII C 2. However the analysis is now sim-
pler, since the estimated channel transmission is not biased,
the null key threshold does not depend on the attack parame-
ter ∆ and only varies with distance. In Fig.6 (a) we enlarge the
scale of Fig.5 (b) and compare the estimated excess noise to
the null key threshold for different distances. As we can see,
when the distance reaches 31 km, the condition ξˆsat < ξnull
can only be satisfied with a choice of ∆ ' 19.5 and level II
criteria conditions cannot be met for smaller distances.
We also estimate the secret key rate of Alice and Bob ver-
sus distance (Fig.6 (b)). A set of parameters ∆ and g can
always be found to meet success criteria II as long as the dis-
tance is large enough (larger than 31km with our simulation
parameters, detailed in VII C 1). Since the estimated channel
transmission T is unchanged, the estimated key rate will be
identical to the key rate in absence of attack. Hence reaching
strategy II, although it cannot be launched on short channels
(high transmission) is a more powerful and more convincing
strategy.
VIII. COUNTER-MEASURES AGAINST THE
SATURATION ATTACK
The vulnerability to the saturation attack, studied in previ-
ous sections, is related to the fact that the first moment (mean
value) of the measured quadratures are by default not moni-
tored in a CV-QKD protocol and can therefore be freely ma-
nipulated by an attacker, opening a practical security loop-
hole. The essence of a counter-measure against the saturation
attack will therefore consist in adding some test procedure to
the CV-QKD protocol, in order to rule out the possibility that
the detector saturates, i.e. that some input optical state has a
quadrature Xin larger than α, characterizing the linear range
of the detection. We present what could be this test proce-
dures, also called counter-measures agains saturation. They
range from post-selection tests, that can be implemented with-
out any modification of CV-QKD hardware, to more struc-
tural modifications of the protocols, requiring extra hardware.
Importantly we first recall that most counter-measure rely on
some pre-existing calibration of the detector.
a. Pre-requisite: calibration and characterization of the
homodyne detection linear range The scope of this article
is restricted to Prepare and Measure (P&M) CV-QKD, where
the detector can be considered trusted, i.e. not influenced by
the eavesdropper. In this context, Alice and Bob, the legit-
imate users, can rely on a (trusted) calibration of the detec-
tor, and in particular on a characterization of the detector lin-
ear range. The homodyne detection is a phase-sensitive de-
vice that transforms an input optical state of quadrature Xin,
measured with respect to the phase reference (local oscilla-
tor) into a measured voltage Vout. For an unsaturated homo-
dyne detection, the relation between Xin and Vout is linear,
with a linear gain that depends on several parameters such
as the local oscillator amplitude, the optical loss, the mode
matching and the electronic gain of the electronics (a tran-
simpedance circuit is commonly used to perform low-noise
measurement of the small differential photocurrent associated
with Xin). All these parameters are not easy to measure in-
dependently, but we can calibrate them globally by measuring
(offline, for example before launching the CV-QKD protocol)
the variance of the homodyne output voltage Vout when the
input is vacuum, possibly for different values of the local os-
cillator power. This corresponds to measuring the shot noise
variance (in voltage) N0,V . Quadrature measurements Xout
are then usually expressed in square-root of shot noise units,
which means that they are renormalized, based on shot noise
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calibration: Xout ≡ Vout/
√
N0,V .
Xout, expressed in square-root of shot noise units, corre-
sponds to the quadrature measurement we want to perform
with our homodyne detection. If the input optical state is also
expressed in square-root of shot noise units then wen have, af-
ter calibration, Xin = Xout, provided the detection is linear.
However, as illustrated in Fig. 2, a realistic detector satu-
rates and in practice the linearity between Xin and Xout can
only be guaranteed over a finite range. We have called α the
linearity bound such that ∀|Xin| < α Xout = Xin. α is
a characteristics of the homodyne detector, for a given local
oscillator power. In practice, the local oscillator power should
be chosen not too large such that the saturation limit is much
larger than the shot noise, i.e. if α is expressed in shot noise
units, we want to have α2  1. Inversely, the local oscillator
power should be chosen not too small, so that the variance of
electronic noise, in shot noise unit, is much smaller than the
shot noise variance: velec  1
b. From an intuitive but faulty counter-measure to an effi-
cient counter-measure based on “radical post-selection” A
simple (but faulty) counter-measure would consist in post-
selecting quadrature measurement results provided they fall
in a “confidence interval” where the homodyne detection is
known to be linear, i.e. typically if they fall within an interval
of the form [−(α− β), α− β]. β can be seen as a confidence
margin, with 0 < β < α. We can however see that such
counter-measure would trigger new problems: it would give
Eve the possibility to influence which data is post-selected and
which one is not, just by controlling the displacement value.
The post-selected data would not be Gaussian and no secu-
rity could be guaranteed. This observation has motivated the
development of the counter-measure based on Gaussian post-
selection that we will detail at the end of this section.
A more radical counter-measure is however possible, that
consists in discarding measurement data blocks if any of the
measured data falls out of the confidence interval [−(α −
β), α − β]. Quadrature measurements and parameter estima-
tion are in practice realized over blocks of large size in order
to limit finite-size effect (for example 108 in [29]). If the de-
tector has been properly calibrated and if its characteristics are
stable over time, then counter-measure based on what we will
call “radical post-selection” will guarantee by construction
that provided it passes the test, a data block has been acquired
with a detector operated in a linear regime. The drawback of
this radical post-selection procedure is that it might lead to
discard some or possibly almost all data blocks if the confi-
dence interval is not large enough (and/or not centered) with
respect to the impinging optical quadrature variance. This
counter-measure will efficiently protect against saturation at-
tacks and is easily implementable. Provided the distribution
of the input quadrature Xin is centered, the confidence inter-
val should typically be larger than six standard deviations, i.e.
α− β > 6√V ar(Xin), so that the probability (per measure-
ment event) to have a saturation is below 2 10−9 and hence
the probability to discard “good” data blocks remain relatively
small. On the other hand, if the linearity domain of the homo-
dyne detection is not large enough, then this countermeasure
might strongly affect the effective key rate , even in the ab-
sence of any attack, which has motivated us to propose a more
refined counter-measure.
c. Gaussian post-selection We now propose a refined
version of the “radical-post-selection”. This new method re-
tains the important advantage of being implementable “at the
software level” by modifying the post-processing stage. It can
moreover cope with detector saturation in a more gentle way
than throwing away the entire data block, as soon as a satu-
rated measurement is detected, as it is the case with radical
post-selection.
The method is based on performing a Gaussian post-
selection of the measurement data. The key idea of such
method is to extract a set of (almost) Gaussian distributed data
among the raw measurement data, and to adjust the parame-
ters of the post-selection so that post-selected data falls almost
certainly within the (calibrated) linearity domain of the ho-
modyne detector. Calling g(x) the probability distribution of
data points after post-selection, the goal of the post-selection
procedure is to choose the parameters of the non-normalized
Gaussian filter g(x) (mean value µg , variance σ2g) under the
following constraints :
1. g is a post-selection function which implies there are
less points after than before post-selection: ∀x ∈
[−α, α], 0 ≤ g(x) ≤ f(x),
2. post-selected data should be almost Gaussian, i.e. the
support of g(x) should be almost contained in the lin-
earity domain:
∫ α
−α g(x)dx '
∫∞
−∞ g(x)dx
3. the number of post-seletect points, N
′ ≡ ∫ α−α g(x)dx,
should be maximized, under the two previous con-
straints.
Performing the Gaussian post-selection first consists in bin-
ning the measured data (size N ). Calling f(x) the normalized
distribution distribution of the raw data (quadrature measure-
ment data) and considering bins centered on measurement re-
sult x and of width δx, there are approximately Nf(x)δx raw
data points falling within a bin. The Gaussian post-selection
consists in randomly selecting a fraction g(x)/f(x) of those
points falling within the bin, and throwing away the others.
After this procedure, applied to each bin, the post-selected
data will have a probability distribution close to g(x) (pro-
vided we have large enough data blocks and use small enough
bins, so that finite size effects remain small).
In order to illustrate how this Gaussian post-selection
method could be realized in practice, we have simulated a
CV-QKD experiment affected by saturation. The results are
displayed on Fig.7. The total number of points is N = 106.
We have assumed a lossy channel between A and B, a dis-
placement ∆ at B, and a homodyne detection affected by
saturation, as described in V A. We have used the following
numerical values: channel distance 25 km, Alice variance
VA = 11.58N0, displacement ∆ = 19.2
√
N0. The blue
dots would correspond to measurement results with a perfect
homodyne detection (no saturation) while the red dots corre-
spond to the results for the realistic detection, affected by sat-
uration, with a linearity limit characterized by α = 20
√
N0.
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FIG. 7: Simulation of Gaussian post-selection. Blue dots: simulated
experimental data with infinite linear detection limit, ∆ = 19.2
√
N0
L = 20km, VA = 11.58N0, data number N = 106; Red dots: sim-
ulated experimental data with linear detection limit α = 20
√
N0,
other parameters are same as blue ones. Green dots: Gaussian
post selected data among the red dots; Gaussian post-selection pa-
rameter, σ2g = 2.5N0, µg = 16.55N0; number of post-selected
points : N
′
= 15.37%N . Other simulation parameters refer to sec-
tion.VII C 1.
The green dots correspond to the Gaussian post-selected data,
applying the procedure detailed above. In order to find the pa-
rameter of the Gaussian filter g(x) we have first removed the
data points falling outside of the linearity domain [−α, α] and
then built the histogram of XBi with bin size δx = 0.1
√
N0.
We could then estimate de probability distribution f(x). The
essential remaining step was to choose the parameters (vari-
ance, mean value, and amplitude A ) of the Gaussian filter
g(x) ≡ A√
2piσg
exp(− (x− µg)
2
2σ2g
) (20)
We have optimized numerically these parameters to max-
imize the number of post-selected points N
′
, under the con-
straints 1 and 2.
We have obtained a total number of post-selected pointsN
′
=
15.37%N (Green dots in Fig.7), while guaranteeing that the
L2 distance between the normalized post selected data distri-
bution and a perfect Gaussian distribution is below 10−3.
The Gaussian post-selection is more complex to implement
than the radical post-selection, but has the advantage of al-
lowing to generate some key, even in presence of moder-
ate saturation. The post-selection also guarantees that post-
selected points fall within the linearity domain of the detector
(therefore guaranteeing linearity of the detector on these post-
selected data points). Moreover the Gaussian post-selection
also guarantees that the distribution of the input data, after
post-selection, is Gaussian and thus that the post-selected data
still implements the GMCS protocol, although with different
channel parameters T ′ and ξ′. As a consequence, provided
T ′ and ξ′ are compatible with secure key generation, some
key can be distilled from the post-selected data, free from any
security threat and attacks exploiting detector saturation.
d. Counter-measures relying on existing techniques, ne-
cessitating some additional hardware The two (radical and
Gaussian) post-selection measures discussed above can be im-
plemented without any additional hardware, which constitutes
an important practical advantage. For completeness we also
discuss here other ways to counter attacks related to satura-
tion, that however all involve some changes not only on the
protocol, but also on the hardware side.
As proposed and implemented in [38], varying randomly
the attenuation, on the signal port, at the input of Bob, allows
to test the linearity of the homodyne output with respect to
the signal input. The saturation attack exploits in particular
the fact that the shot noise variance is calibrated in absence
of signal (attenuation η = 0) while the total noise variance
is measured with no attenuation (η = 1) and with saturation
(when the attack is launched) As a consequence the excess
noise is underestimated. Such attack cannot however be per-
formed if the total noise variance is estimated with more than
2 attenuation values and in particular is the linearity of the
total noise with the attenuation is checked. This is precisely
the countermeasure proposed in [38], that constitutes an effec-
tive parade against the saturation attack. The drawback of this
countermeasure is however that it requires another hardware
element, bringing additional complexity, and also that it leads
to attenuate the signal and thus reduce the key rate.
MDI CV-QKD can be used to perform QKD with untrusted
detectors. It could therefore in particular be used to perform
CV-QKD securely with practical homodyne detectors, subject
of saturation. This would however be at the expense of a sig-
nificant increase of the experimental complexity (in particular
phase locking of two distant lasers) and also at the expense of
performance since only low to moderate losses can be toler-
ated in MDI CV-QKD [39].
Finally, one could notice that the saturation attack requires
to strongly displace the mean value of the quadrature signal.
The signals impinging on the homodyne detection must there-
fore have a high energy. The method proposed in [40], in
another context, could then be used as a counter-measure: it
consists in upper bounding, with an auxiliary homodyne de-
tector (sometimes called watch-dog in other contexts [41]) the
energy of the impinging signals. One limitation of this method
is however that it is in general not possible to predict in which
mode an attacker will try to send energy in order to saturate
the detector. It can thus be very difficult to design in practice
a watch-dog capable of detecting any attempts to saturate the
detector.
IX. CONCLUSION
We have studied quantitatively how the saturation attack
can be used to compromise the security of practical CV-QKD
systems. The main finding of our study is that the excess noise
can be actively reduced by displacing the quadratures mean
value of the coherent states received by Bob, and that this ef-
fect can compromise the security of Gaussian-modulated co-
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herent state CV-QKD protocol, operated with practical detec-
tors whose linearity response can only be guaranteed over a
restricted domain of quadrature values.
We have proposed an explicit attack, called saturation at-
tack, that combines displacement with a full intercept-resend
attack. We have performed numerical simulations that show
the feasibility of our attack under realistic experimental con-
ditions. The saturation attack consists in strongly displacing
the quadrature mean values, to induce saturation of Bob detec-
tor. Our attack is achievable with current technology and may
impact the security all CV-QKD implementation, since any
practical detectors is subject to saturation. An experimental
demonstration of this attack is the topic of an ongoing work.
While all previous attacks on CV-QKD had focused on lo-
cal oscillator manipulation and biasing excess noise evalua-
tion, our attack has no influence on the local oscillator, and
can thus not be ruled out by generating the local oscillator lo-
cally [15, 16]. It is therefore important to propose practical
solutions against this attack, and we have presented in detail
two effective counter-measures based on post-selection, that
can be implemented without requiring any modification at the
hardware level. This work illustrates the importance of putting
under great scrutiny the hypothesis under which the security
proof can be derived, but also illustrates that secure and yet
still practical QKD implementations are within reach.
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Appendix A: Calculation of the correlation under the saturation
attack
In order to clearly show the calculation, we consider ysat,
y, x and z as the notations of XBsat , XBlin , XA and XN re-
spectively. We use XBsat (Eq.(8)) to calculate the correlation
Cov(XA, XBsat) under the saturation attack. We assume here
α >> 1 and consider ∆ ≥ 0, while the analysis of ∆ ≤ 0 is
similar. The saturation model can be considered as:
ysat = α, t
g√
2
x+ z + ∆ > α
ysat = t
g√
2
x+ z + ∆, | t g√
2
x+ z + ∆ |< α(α >> 1,∆ ≥ 0)
ysat = −α, t g√
2
x+ z + ∆ 6 −α
(A1)
x ∼ N (0, σ2x) and z ∼ N (0, σ2z) are both centered Gaussian
variables with probability density function pX(x) and pZ(z),
respectively:
pX(x) =
e
− x2
2σ2x√
2piσx
, pZ(z) =
e
− z2
2σ2z√
2piσz
. (A2)
In which σ2x = V ar(XA) and σ
2
z = N0 + ηTξ + vele. By
knowing pX(x) and pZ(z), we can calculate Cov(x, ysat)
with double integral of x and z in the domain Dxz . Dxz is de-
fined in Eq.(A1): −α < tg√
2
x+z+∆ < α, tg√
2
x+z+∆ ≤ −α
and tg√
2
x+z+∆ ≥ α. A long but straight forward calculation
of Cov(x, ysat) is presented as follows:
Cov(XA, XBsat) = 〈xysat〉 − 〈x〉〈ysat〉 = 〈xysat〉
=
∫∫
Dxz
xypX(x)pZ(z)dxdz
=
∫∫
−α< tg√
2
x+z+∆<α
(
tg√
2
x2 + x∆ + xz)pX(x)pZ(z)dxdz
+
∫∫
tg√
2
x+z+∆≤−α
−αxpX(x)pZ(z)dxdz
+
∫∫
tg√
2
x+z+∆≥α
αxpX(x)pZ(z)dxdz.
(A3)
Cov(XA, XBsat) =
=
1
2piσxσz
∞∫
−∞
(
tg√
2
x2 + x∆)e
− x2
σ2x dx
α−∆− tg√
2
x∫
−α−∆− tg√
2
x
e
− z2
2σ2z dz
=
1
2piσxσz
∞∫
−∞
(
tg√
2
x2 + x∆)e
− x2
σ2x
√
pi
2
σz[erf(
α+ ∆ + tg√
2
x
√
2σz
)
+ erf(
α−∆− tg√
2
x
√
2σz
)]dx
=
1
2piσx
√
pi
2
[
tg√
2
∞∫
−∞
x2e
− x2
2σ2x dx
+ ∆
∞∫
−∞
erf(
α−∆− tg√
2
x
√
2σz
)xe−
x2
2σx dx]
=
tg
2
√
2piσx
√
pi
2
√
2piσ3x
+
tg
2
√
2piσx
√
pi
2
√
2piσ3xerf(
α−∆√
2(σ2z +
t2g2
2 σ
2
x)
)
=
tg
2
√
2
σ2x[1 + erf(
α−∆√
2(σ2z +
t2g2
2 σ
2
x)
)]
(A4)
Thus we can conclude that
Cov(XA, XBsat) =
tg
2
√
2
〈X2A〉[1 + erf(
α−∆√
2V ar(XBlin)
)].
(A5)
In which, the error function erf(x) is defined as:
erf(x) =
2√
pi
∫ x
0
e−t
2
dt. (A6)
And we have used the integral formulas of erf(x) provided in
[37]. In Eq.(A4), V ar(XBlin) = σ
2
z +
t2g2
2 σ
2
x is variance of
Bob with no saturation. In this calculation, the integrals of the
odd functions with symmetric bounds (−∞,∞) are equal to
zero.
Appendix B: Calculation of the variance of Bob under the
saturation attack
In order to calculate the variance of Bob under the satura-
tion attack, we use the step function θ(x) which is defined as:
θ(x) =
{
1, x ∈ [0,∞)
0, x ∈ (−∞, 0] (B1)
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With Eq.(B1) we can transform Eq.(A1) into:
ysat = yθ(y + ∆ + α)θ(−y −∆ + α)
+ α[1− θ(y + ∆ + α)θ(−y −∆ + α)]
≈ α+ (y + ∆− α)θ(−y −∆ + α)
= α+ (y − ε)θ(−y + ε).
(B2)
in which:
ε = α−∆(α > 0,∆ ≥ 0), (B3)
y = t
g√
2
x+ z. (B4)
Since x and z are both Gaussian variables, y is also a Gaus-
sian variable (y ∼ N (0, σ2y)), with its probability function
pY (y) =
e
− y
2
2σ2y√
2piσy
and σ2y = V ar(XBlin) is the variance of Bob
under linear detection. In order to estimate V ar(XBsat) =
V ar(ysat) = 〈y2sat〉 − 〈ysat〉2, we need to calculate 〈ysat〉
and 〈y2sat〉, respectively:
〈ysat〉 = α+ 〈(y − ε)θ(−y + ε)〉 = α+ C, (B5)
〈y2sat〉 = 〈α2 + 2α(y − ε)θ(−y + ε) + (y − ε)2θ(−y + ε)〉
(B6)
= α2 − 2αC +D. (B7)
In which C and D are equal to 〈(y− ε)θ(−y+ ε)〉 and 〈(y−
ε)2θ(−y + ε)〉, and can be calculated as follows:
C =
∞∫
−∞
pY (y)(y − ε)θ(−y + ε)dy (B8)
=
∞∫
−∞
pY (y
′ + ε)y′θ(−y′)dy′ =
0∫
−∞
pY (y
′ + ε)y′dy′
(B9)
= −[ σy√
2pi
e
− ε2
2σ2y +
ε
2
+
ε
2
erf(
ε√
2σy
)] (B10)
D = 〈(y − ε)2θ(−y + ε)〉 =
∞∫
−∞
pY (y)(y − ε)2θ(−y + ε)dy
(B11)
=
∞∫
−∞
pY (y
′ + ε)y′2θ(−y′)dy′ =
0∫
−∞
pY (y
′ + ε)y′2dy′
(B12)
=
εσy√
2pi
e
− ε2
2σ2y +
ε2 + σ2y
2
[1 + erf(
ε√
2σy
)]. (B13)
We have used y′ = y − ε in the calculations of C and D.
Provided with C and D, we can calculate V ar(ysat):
V ar(ysat) = 〈y2sat〉 − 〈ysat〉2
= α2 − 2αC +D − (α+ C)2 = D − C2
= σ2y[
1 + erf( ε√
2σy
)
2
− e
− ε2
σ2y
2pi
]− εσy√
2pi
erf(
ε√
2σy
)e
− ε2
2σ2y
+
ε2
4
[1− erf2( ε√
2σy
)]
= V ar(XBlin)(
1 +A
2
− B
2
2pi
)
− (α−∆)
√
V ar(XBlin)
2pi
A ∗B + (α−∆)
2
4
(1−A2)
(B14)
in which:
A = erf(
α−∆√
2V ar(XBlin)
), B = e
− (α−∆)2
2V ar(XBlin
) (B15)
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